Balkan Alliance, Baghdad Pact, and the Syrian Crisis: Turkey at the Heart of Cold War Diplomacy

In this new section, we will transition along that strategic line stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East. We will focus on regional developments that affected our country's security and foreign policy, such as the Balkan Alliance, the Baghdad Pact, and the Syrian Crisis. After closing this important file, we will set sail for brand-new topics.

Balkan Alliance

The first critical step in this new phase stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East is the Balkan Alliance, or the Balkan Pact, dated August 9, 1954. This alliance was formed when Yugoslavia, the only communist state outside of Soviet control, came together with Türkiye and Greece, whose entries into NATO were already guaranteed. The main goal was to prevent the USSR from expanding into the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

Member Countries of the Balkan Alliance

The rapprochement among the three countries, which began towards the end of 1951, became official with the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” signed in Ankara on February 28, 1953. Under this agreement, the parties decided to consult each other on matters of common interest and to hold meetings at the foreign minister level at least once a year. As a result of these ongoing meetings, the Bled Agreement was signed on August 9, 1954, transforming the alliance fully into a military pact.

In fact, any attack directed at one of them would be considered an attack against all, and all necessary measures, including military force, would be taken. However, things did not go as smoothly as they appeared on paper. From the very first days, disagreements between Turkey and Yugoslavia emerged, and Yugoslavia's interest in the pact began to wane as it mended its relations with the Soviets after 1955. On top of that, when the Cyprus Issue erupted between Turkey and Greece, the positive atmosphere created by the pact completely faded away. Managing to exist on paper until 1960, the pact officially came to an end and became history in June 1960.

Member Countries of the Baghdad Pact

Another major development that fundamentally shook the balance in the Middle East was the Baghdad Pact, established on February 24, 1955. Seeing the decline of French and British influence in the region, a new alliance idea emerged to prevent Soviet Russia from infiltrating the Middle East. Although this idea originally came from the US, it was Türkiye that put it into action, and the pact was initially signed between Türkiye and Iraq. The pact quickly expanded with the participation of the UK, Pakistan, and Iran, but unfortunately, it failed to create the expected unifying effect in the Arab world.

On the contrary, Arab countries other than Iraq strongly opposed the pact, and the Middle East was literally split into three camps: those who joined, those who strongly opposed it (led by Egypt), and those who remained neutral. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who did not want to lose the leadership of the Middle East to Türkiye and dreamed of uniting the Arab world under his own roof, reacted strongly to this situation. Nasser’s increasing anti-Western sentiment and his rapprochement with the Soviets directly paved the way for the Suez Crisis and ironically made the USSR's job in the region much easier. The real blow that changed the fate of the pact came from Iraq, where the monarchy was overthrown in 1958; the new administration officially announced its withdrawal from the pact on March 24, 1959.

With Iraq’s departure, the headquarters of the organization was immediately moved to Ankara, and its name was changed to CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) on August 18, 1959. In fact, CENTO’s first meeting was held in Washington in October 1959. Although initially established as a military defence alliance, the organization gradually shifted its focus to economic, cultural, and technical cooperation among its members. However, this unity reached the point of collapse when Pakistan and Iran left on March 12, 1979. The very next day, with Türkiye announcing that it respected these withdrawal decisions and that CENTO had effectively lost its function in the region, this alliance, which had marked an era, came to a de facto, if not legal, end.

Syrian scouts on the parade at the year of the crisis

Another major flashpoint in the Middle East was the Syrian Crisis that erupted in 1957. Syria, which had gained its independence from France prior to World War II, was heavily shaken by successive government coups in the 1950s. Amidst this political instability, Syria’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union, driven by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, disturbed its neighbours. Particularly, when Syria signed an aid agreement with the USSR in 1956, it was met with fierce backlash from Türkiye, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon. These countries had come to firmly believe that Syria was turning into a mere “Moscow Satellite.” 

The situation grew so tense that US President Eisenhower sent a message to Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, guaranteeing immediate American weapons aid if Türkiye, Iraq, and Jordan were forced to launch a military operation in response to a potential Syrian attack. Following this assurance, Türkiye’s decision to mass troops on the Syrian border and conduct military exercises brought relations between the two countries to the breaking point.

While the USSR escalated its counter-pressure during this critical period, the region ultimately stepped back from the brink of war. The crisis was gradually resolved thanks to the unwavering support of the US for Türkiye, Saudi Arabia’s mediation between the two nations, and Jordan’s King Hussein softening his stance toward Syria. Another crucial factor in ending the crisis was the historic agreement signed between Syria and Egypt on September 14, 1957. 

The two states decided to form a union under the name of the “United Arab Republic” starting from February 1, 1958. However, this political marriage, which made a massive impact in the Arab world, did not last long; their ties weakened over time, and the union officially ended with a government coup staged by conservative military officers in Syria in 1961.

We are finally putting aside the political maps, the never-ending border conflicts, the secret treaties, and the threats of nuclear war. As we close our Cold War file, we turn our course to perhaps the most fascinating, transformative, and impactful front of this era on our daily lives: Socio-cultural and scientific developments.

The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Lebanon Crisis: America's New Role in the Middle East

The Suez Crisis had drastically shifted the pieces on the Middle Eastern chessboard. Following this crisis, the US realized that the image of traditional Western colonial powers like Britain and France in the Arab world was completely shattered, and Soviet Russia (USSR) was rapidly filling this void, increasing its prestige.

America’s Middle East Shield: The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)

To halt this trend, US President Eisenhower sent a historic message to the US Congress on January 5, 1957. In this message, Eisenhower stated that after the Suez Crisis, the USSR was close to dominating the Suez Canal and the Middle Eastern oil resources, the lifeblood of the West, thereby bringing the region under political control and dealing a fatal blow to the Western Bloc.

With this move, which would go down in history as the Eisenhower Doctrine, the President requested authorization to provide direct economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries, to use US armed forces directly if these countries faced an attack from communist nations, and to spend $200 million annually for this purpose.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

How did it differ from the Truman Doctrine? Although the US first showed its interest in the Middle Eastern borders with the Truman Doctrine, that was a narrowly framed plan limited only to Türkiye and Greece, primarily envisioning “military aid.” In contrast, the Eisenhower Doctrine encompassed the entire Middle Eastern region and, most importantly, guaranteed that these countries would be defended against communism personally by the US, under the condition of “the actual use of American troops when necessary.” 

Through this doctrine, the US completely filled the power vacuum left by Britain and France (following the Suez fiasco) and stepped up against the USSR as the new protector of the Middle East. However, the doctrine split the Arab world in two: while Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Türkiye, Greece, Afghanistan, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco supported the plan; Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, swept by nationalist winds, reacted strongly against it.

The Doctrine’s First Test: The Lebanon Crisis (1958) The first major crisis where the Eisenhower Doctrine was put to the test erupted shortly after. During the 1957 general elections in Lebanon, pro-Western President Camille Chamoun rigged the elections to install a parliament that would extend his term for another 4 years, and on top of that, he accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. This created a massive political crisis in the country. With the country on the brink of civil war, President Chamoun immediately appealed to the US, Britain, and France, claiming that everything happening was the result of “foreign intervention” (specifically by neighbouring Syria, and indirectly the USSR/Egypt alliance), and requested urgent military aid for Lebanon. The US, initially reluctant to engage in direct military intervention, changed its mind when the balance in the region suddenly turned upside down. The bloody coup in Iraq that toppled the pro-Western monarchy and heavily damaged the Baghdad Pact, the Western shield in the Middle East, threw the US into a panic. Consequently, the US invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine and landed exactly 15,000 American troops in Lebanon. Under the show of force by the American navy and troops, coupled with diplomatic pressure, President Chamoun agreed to drop his bid to extend his term. The crisis subsided when the Chief of Staff, Fuad Chehab, who was respected by all factions, was elected as the new president by the Lebanese parliament. U.S. Marine sits in a foxhole and points a machine gun towards Beirut, Lebanon With this, we have concluded that first decade which drew the borders of the Middle East in blood: the establishment of Israel, the devastating toll of the Arab-Israeli wars, the imperialist debacle at Suez, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, which marked direct US military intervention in the region. We saw step-by-step how the unending fire between Israel and Palestine was first stoked, and how Iran, attempting to claim its own oil, was silenced by a coup. Our new series: Developments in the Far East.

Black Gold and the Suez Crisis: Oil, Nasser, and the End of British Power in the Middle East

In the previous blog, we looked at the Arab-Israeli conflicts, a struggle rooted one hundred years ago that continues to bleed the Middle East today. Now we turn to the subject that has been behind the greatest imperial interventions and coups of the 20th century: black gold. Oil.

From the early 1900s, the right to extract and process Iranian oil had been held by a massive British monopoly, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the predecessor of the oil giant now known as BP (British Petroleum). This arrangement was renewed through a new agreement in 1933.

After the Second World War, as Britain lost much of its global empire and its power began to fade, the Iranian people were receiving almost nothing from the enormous wealth flowing out of their own land. The Iranian government initially asked for a revision of the agreement, a modest increase in the share being paid to Iran by the company.

But Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, the visionary leader of the nationalist front in the Iranian parliament, firmly rejected these surface-level compromises. His vision was far more radical: the immediate nationalisation of Iranian oil and the complete removal of foreign monopoly control. Backed by overwhelming public support, Mosaddegh was appointed Prime Minister of Iran on 28 April 1951, and his very first act was to announce to the world the official nationalisation of Iranian oil. For Britain, this was nothing less than the cutting of its economic lifeline in the Middle East.

25 July 1952 issue of the Tehran Mosavvar: "Iran has won", featuring Mosaddegh and Churchill.

The Suez Crisis

Before we get into the Suez Crisis, I want to share a small personal note. During my undergraduate studies, I read a play about the British Empire and its then Prime Minister Anthony Eden. The Suez Canal crisis and Gamal Abdel Nasser both appeared in that text. At the time, I only had a surface-level understanding of the events. Now, we are about to see the full picture.

On 23 July 1952, a military coup carried out by the Free Officers Movement brought Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in Egypt. Once in office, Nasser worked toward two ambitious goals: the creation of a collective security pact among Arab states, an Arab Union, and the building of a broader solidarity under the umbrella of Islam.

But Nasser’s larger vision went even further. He wanted to form a Third Bloc a new power block positioned between the Eastern and Western blocs of the Cold War. However, the establishment of the Baghdad Pact disrupted his plans entirely.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at the foundation ceremony of the Aswan High Dam.

When the US and the World Bank refused to fund the Aswan Dam project, Nasser responded by nationalising the Suez Canal. In 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which was under British-French joint ownership. Following this, America, Britain, and France made numerous attempts to remove Suez from Egyptian control but were unsuccessful.

Upon Nasser's rejection of the proposal to leave the canal under international control, Britain, France, and Israel came together and prepared a plan to seize the canal. (This is the event that was the subject of the theatrical play I mentioned earlier; the play drew its reference from here.) According to this plan, Israel would attack Egypt; Britain and France would then deploy troops to the region under the pretext of ending the war, and subsequently take over the canal. In accordance with this plan, Israel launched an attack against Egypt on October 29, 1956.

Following their ultimatum to the parties to “end the conflict,” Britain and France began deploying troops to the region via the Mediterranean. USSR Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent a message to US President Eisenhower, requesting that the US and the USSR send a joint force to Egypt to stop the war, stating that otherwise, this could lead to World War III. However, the US strongly opposed the joint force proposal and declared that it would take the necessary measures if the Soviets sent troops to Egypt.

The US Government and public did not accept this attack initiated by Britain and France. Indeed, the US reaction was harsh; it issued a stern warning to Britain, France, and Israel, demanding their withdrawal from Egyptian territory. These states were forced to withdraw from Egypt. The Suez Canal was subsequently cleared and reopened to global maritime traffic in March 1957. The most important consequence of the 1956 Suez Crisis was that while the aim was to eliminate Soviet Russia's prestige and influence in the Middle East, it actually increased them even further.